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SPECIAL VERDICTS AND INTERROGATORIESf
PAUL R. STINSON*
The proposed General Code of Civil Procedure for the state of Missouri,
Plan II, raises squarely the question whether the practice of Special Verdicts
and Interrogatories should be adopted for the courts of Missouri. The
Advisory Committee made no recommendation on type of verdict, but in
Article 9 the supreme court has proposed two alternative sections for study.
Section 15 is Federal Rule 49,1 which permits the trial court to require the
jury to return a special verdict, or to submit special interrogatories to be
answered along with the general verdict. Section 16, which is Missouri
tThe writer gratefully acknowledges the collaboration of Paul Oberst of
Kansas City, Missouri, in the preparation of this article.
*Attorney, Kansas City. LL.B. Yale University, 1907.
1. Federal Rule 49. SPECIAL VERDICTS AND INTERROGATORIES.
(a) Special Verdicts. The court may require a jury to return only a special
verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact. In that
event the court may submit to the jury written questions susceptible of categorical
or other brief answer or may submit written forms of the several special findings
which might properly be made under the pleadings and evidence; or it may use
such other method of submitting the issues and requiring the written findings
thereon as it deems most appropriate. The court shall give to the jury such explana-
tion and instruction concerning the matter thus submitted as may be necessary to
enable the jury to make its findings upon each issue. If in so doing the court omits
any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives his
right to a trial by jury of the issue so omitted unless before the jury retires he
demands its submission to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such demand
the court may make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have
made a finding in accord with the judgment on the special verdict.
(b) General Verdict Accompanied by Answer to Interrogatories. The court
may submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general verdict,
written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of which is
necessary to a verdict. The court shall give such explanation or instruction as may
be necessary to enable the jury both to make answers to the interrogatories and to
render a general verdict, and the court shall direct the jury both to make written
answers and to render a general verdict. When the general verdict and the answers
are harmonious, the court shall direct the entry of the appropriate judgment upon
the verdict and answers. When the answers are consistent with each other, but one
or more is inconsistent with the general verdict, the court may direct the entry
of judgment in accordance with the answers, notwithstanding the general verdict
or may return the jury for further consideration of its answers and verdict or may
order a new trial. When the answers are inconsistent with each other and one or
more is likewise inconsistent with the general verdict, the court shall not direct
the entry of judgment but may return the jury for further consideration of its
answers and verdict or may order a new trial.
(142)
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Revised Statutes 1939, Sections 1120-1121,, would continue present practice.
Since the bar of Missouri is at the present time almost entirely unfamiliar
with the type of practice proposed under Section 15, it is necessary that
consideration be given to its background and its operation in other juris-
dictions in which it has been used, before a rational choice can be made.
THE GENERAL VEIWCT
The Missouri statutes provide for both general and special verdicts,
but "in every issue for the recovery of money only, or specific real or per-
sonal property, the jury shall render a general verdict."'3 Since the statutes
also provide that a party is entitled to trial by jury as a matter of right on
can issue of fact in an action for the recovery of money only, or of specific
real or personal property,"4 it will be seen that the instances where the
general verdict must be used are usually those where the right of trial by
jury exists in civil cases. The special verdict is relegated in Missouri to those
cases where the right of trial by jury does not egist but in which the court
is of the opinion that a fact should be determined by a jury or in which
it wishes to take the advice of a jury.5
These general verdict statutes have a long history in Missouri., They
have stood in this exact form for almost ninety years, with the exception
2. SECTION 1120. GENERAL VERDICT, WHEN RENDERED-In every issue for
the recovery of money only, or specific real or personal property, the jury shall
render a general verdict
SECTION 1121. SPECIAL WHEN.-In all other cases, if at any time during the
progress of any cause, it shall, in the opinion of the court, become necessary to
determine any fact in controversy by the verdict of a jury, the court may direct
an issue or issues to be made.
Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1119, which defines the terms used in § 1120-1121, is
also pertinent:
SECTION 1119. VERDICTS, GENERAL AND SPECIAL.-The verdict of a jury is
either general or special. A general verdict is that by which they pronounce gen-
erally upon all or any of the issues, either in favor of the plaintiff or defendant. A
special verdict is that by which the jury finds the facts only, leaving the judgment
to the court
3. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1120.
4. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1099: "An issue of fact in an action for the
recovery of money only, or of specific real or personal property, must be tried by
a jury, unless a jury trial be waived or a reference ordered as hereinafter provided."
5. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1100: "Every other issue must be tried by the
court, which, however, may take the opinion of a jury upon any specific question
of fact involved therein for that purpose, or may refer it, as hereinafter provided."
6. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1119-1121 are identical with Mo. REv. STAT.
(1929) H§ 968-870; Mo. REv. STAT. (1919) § 1418-1420; Mo. REv. STAT. (1909)
§§ 1988-90; Mo. REv. STAT. (1899) §§ 720-722; Mo. REv. STAT. (1889) §§ 2160-2162;
Mo. REv. STAT. (1879) H§ 3628-3630; Mo. REv. STAT. (1865) §§ 20-22, p. 674; Mo.
REv. STAT. (1855) §§ 20-22, p. 1263.
1942)
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of a brief period from 1885 to 1887, when they were temporarily supplanted
by a special interrogatory statute.7 While Missouri has adhered steadfastly
to general verdict practice, it has been subjected to a steady barrage of
criticism by persons interested in the reform of judicial procedure, especially
in the last twenty years.
Sunderland has characterized the the general verdict as "inscrutable and
as essentially mysterious as the judgment which issued from the ancient
oracle of Delphi." "No one but the jurors can tell what was put in it," he
says, "and the jurors will not be heard to say.", He points out that while
the function of the jury is properly that of finding the facts, the general
verdict is composed of three elements: (a) the facts, (b) the law, and (c)
the application of the law to the facts. Hence, the general verdict, he says,
is a compound made by the jury which is incapable of
being broken up into its constituent parts. No judicial re-agents
exist for either a qualitative or a quantitative analysis. The law
supplies the means neither for determining what facts were found,
nor what principles of law were applied, nor how the application
was made.'
0
7. Mo. Laws 18 85, p. 213,, repealed §§ 3629-3630 of Mo. REV. STAT. (1879)
and substituted the following:
"Section 3629-In all actions the jury shall, upon the issues made up and
submitted to them by the court, return a general verdict, and the court, upon
the request of either party, shall direct the jury, under proper instructions, to
find a special verdict upon all or any of the issues submitted to them, which
submissions shall be in writing, distinctly specifying each issue on which the
jury are to find, and such special finding shall be recorded with the verdict.
Whenever the special finding of fact is inconsistent with the general verdict, the
former shall control the latter, and the court must give judgment accordingly.
"Section 3630-The verdict of the jury, as well as any special finding, shall
be reduced to writing, and signed and returned into court by the foreman." .
Although this practice was sometimes spoken of as the "special verdict" by
the Missouri courts, that term is a misnomer. The statute clearly called for a
general verdict, but allowed special interrogatories, and hence is more closely
comparable with section (b) of the proposed rule, than with section (a).
Mo. Laws 1887, p. 229, repealed the Act of 1885 and reinstated the repealed
sections in their original form.
8. Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special (1920) 29 YALE L. J. 253;
Wicker, Special Interrogatories to Juries in Civil Cases (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 296;
Green, A New Development in Jury Trial (1927) 13 A.B.A.J. 715; Wicker, Trials
and New Trials (1938) 15 TENN. L. REv. 570; Note, Special Verdicts, (1940) 34 ILL.
L. REv. 96; Lipscomb, Special Verdicts under the Federal Rules (1940) 25 WAsH.
U. L. Q. 185.
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To take a concrete case, let us suppose that Jones Construction Com-
.pany has built a house for John Smith and the transaction has ended in a
lawsuit. Smith files his petition, alleging that the defendant company agreed
to build a house for him according to certain specifications for $3100. He
says that the defendant used inferior lumber in the flooring, second-hand
brick in the foundation, and failed to finish the interior. He alleges payment
and asserts that he has been damaged to the amount of $1000. The defend-
ant denies generally the allegations of the petition. At the trial defendant
introduces evidence showing that the lumber used was first-grade, that
Smith had agreed to the change in foundation brick, that the interior had
been finished according to the custom of the trade, and that Smith had
paid only $2700. The case is finally submitted by the court to the jury with
several pages of instructions, correctly stating the law on all the possible
hypotheses of fact. The jury returns a verdict of $100 for the plaintiff.
What does this verdict of $100 for Smith mean? Did the jury find that
Smith had paid the company $2700, or $3100? Was the lumber first-grade
or inferior, and if the latter, what damages? Had the parties agreed to
change the specifications on foundation brick or not, and, if not, what dam-
ages? Was the interior properly finished according to the custom of the
trade, and what was the custom, ahd what damages?
Having found the facts, did the jury understand the law? Did it com-
prehend the law of contracts on specifications, waivers, and alteration? Did
the jury understand the effect that law gives to custom? Did it take into
account where the law placed the burden of proof? And having found the
facts, if it did, and having understood the law, if it did, did the jury apply
the law to the facts correctly? Or was the jury confused on the facts and
confounded by the instructions, so that it returned a verdict on the basis
of its general feeling, or on the basis of a compromise among the varying
attitudes of its members?
To be sure, the general verdict has its merits. It is definite and, if evi-
dence can be found to support it, it is conclusive, provided, of course, no
error was made in the pleading, evidence, instructions, and other procedure
leading up to it. Its advocates claim another advantage for it in that it exerts
a humanizing influence on the law. To a certain extent it is within the jury's
power to alleviate the rigors of the law, where its literal application would
work a hardship on a party. This function of the jury has been called "pop-
19421
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ular equity" by its proponents, and "government by jury instead of law"
by its opponents.
While writers may join in criticizing the general verdict, they do not
always agree upon what should be done to improve it. In general, two sug-
gestions have been tried and each has its supporters. One suggested improve-
ment is the special verdict,11 and the other is the use of special interrogatories
along with the general verdict.' 2 Section 15 proposes that either may be
used in the discretion of the court. They are quite different, both in history
and practice, and require separate consideration, although today their gen-
eral purpose is the same.
Special Verdicts
Although the origin of the special verdict has been traced back to the
perils of attaint at the early common law, 13 its first appearance in Missouri
seems to be in the Code of 1849, when it was provided that
"In every action for the recovery of money only, or specific
real or personal property, the jury in their discretion may render
a general or a special verdict. In all other cases, the court may direct
the jury to find a special verdict, in writing, upon all or any of the
issues...,,14
Little use was made of the procedure, however, and in the Code of 1855,
the statute was amended to require the jury to return a general verdict in
issues for the recovery of money only, or specific real and personal property.15
The adoption of the special verdict in 1849 was no doubt part of the general
movement among the states to adopt the New York Code of 1848,10 and
11. Ibid; Green, A New Development in Jury Trial (1927) 13 A.B.A.J. 715;
Lipscomb, Special Verdicts Under the Federal Rules (1940) 25 WAsH. U. L. Q. 185.
12. Wicker, Trials and New Trials (1938) 15 TENN. L. REv. 570; Wicker,
Special Interrogatories to Juries in Civil Cases (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 296.
13. See Morgan, A Brief History of Special Verdicts and Special Interroga-
tories (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 575. Although the modem special verdict is usually
in the form of short answers to specific questions, at the common law the jury often
"told the facts." For a comparable fact recital by a jury see Spalding v. Mayhall,
27 Mo. 377 (1858).
14. Mo. Laws 1849, p. 89, Art. XIV. It should be noticed that choice of
general or special verdict was left to the discretion of the jury.
15. Mo. REv. STAT. (1855) p. 1263.
16. New York Code 1848, § 216 provided: "The court may direct the jury
to find a special verdict in writing upon all or any of the issues; or may instruct
them, if they render a general verdict, to find upon particular questions of fact, to
be stated in writing, and may direct a written finding thereon."
[Vol. 7
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many states thereafter provided for special verdicts-. Interpreted against
a common-law background, however, the special verdict soon became so
hedged about by restrictions and technicalities as to become almost useless
as a method of procedure. For instance, special verdicts might be over-
turned because they found conclusions of law instead of facts,18 but on the
other hand, it was improper to require the jury to find "evidentiary" facts
instead of "ultimate" facts.19 In special verdict practice a question could
not be put to the jury in a form that was "leading," in the same sense as
a question on direct examination might be "leading,"20 or in a way that in-
formed the jury of the legal effect of its answer.2' It might be held on appeal
that the questions on which the special verdict was found were uncertain or
misleading, or that the answers to them were inconsistent.22
The greatest single difficulty, however, arose from the rule that the
special verdict had to be "complete," on the principle that a party is entitled
to a trial by jury on every material issue. If the jury failed to find any
material fact necessary for the recovery of a party, his case failed. The court
had no power to supplement the jury's findings,23 and if judgment were given
for a party on a special verdict which omitted a material fact, it could be
reversed, even though the evidence on the point was clear and convincing.24
Failure to find on all facts was equivalent to a finding against the party
having the burden of proof.2 5 The United States Supreme Court even held
that where facts "conceded or not disputed at the trial" were omitted, the
court could not presume that trial by jury on the omitted findings had been
waived; and hence if the -findings were material the judgment could not
17. For a list of states having special verdict statutes see Note (1940) 34 ILL.
L. REv. 96. Several states have since adopted the Federal Rules completely or in
modified form.
18. Howard v. Beldenville Lumber Co., 129 Wis. 98, 108 N. W. 48 (1906).
19. Baxter v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 104 Wis. 307, 80 N. W. 644 (1899).
20. Benton v. St Louis & S. F. Ry., 25 Mo. App. 155 (1887).
21. Anderson v. Seelo*, 224 Wis. 230, 271 N. W. 844 (1937).
22. See Dooley, Use of Special Issues Under New Taxes Rules (1941) 20
TEXAs L. REv. 32.
23. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Commercial Nat'l Bank, 55 F. (2d) 564
(C.C.A. 5th, 1932).
24. Barnes v. Williams, 11 Wheat 415 (U. S. 1826); Prentice v. Zane's Adm.,
8 Howard 483 (U. S. 1850); Wilson v. Southern Ry., 165 N. C. 499, 81 S. E. 684
(1914).
25. Mulvaney v. Burroughs, 152 Iowa 439, 132 N. W. 873 (1911). Cf. Flan-
nery v. Kansas City, St J. & C. B. Ry., 23 Mo. App. 120 (1886).
1942]
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stand.26 Because of this hazard, the special verdict met with little use despite
statutes permitting it in almost half the states.
In Sillima-n v. Gano, Chief Justice Gaines, of the Texas Supreme Court,
reluctantly applied the strict rule that omitted facts could not be presumed,
but said:
"Probably the Legislature could pass no measure better calcu-
lated to promote a prompt and proper disposition of causes than
to provide that, when a case is submitted upon special issues, the
submission of all issues not requested by a party to a suit shall,
upon appeal, be deemed to have been waived, and such issue shall
be presumed to have been determined in such manner as to support
the judgment of the court.127
This intelligent dictum marks the beginning of modern special verdict
practice. The suggestion was immediately incorporated into law by the
Texas legislature,28 and Wisconsin shortly followed suit.29 In both of these
states the modified special verdict practice was widely used and this no
doubt paved the way for the adoption of Federal Rule 49.
This rule has been adopted for the federal courts in the following
language:
".... If in so doing [i.e. in submitting the case for special ver-
dict] the court omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or
by the evidence, each party waives his right to a trial by jury of the
issue so omitted unless before the jury retires he demands its sub-
mission to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such demand
the court may make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be
deemed to have made a finding in accord with the judgment on a
special verdict. '30
This provision puts the burden of securing a "complete" jury verdict
squarely on the parties, on whom it reasonably should belong, and if either
the jury or the court inadvertently fails to make findings of all essential
26. Hodges v. Easton, 106 U. S. 408 (1883).
27. 90 Tex. 637, 39 S. W. 559 (1897).
28. Texas Laws 1897, Spec. Sess. c. 7.
29. Wis. Laws 1907, § 2858m. Michigan followed in 1931, Mich. Ct. Rules
1931, Rule 7, § 7.
30. The question of denial of right of trial by jury may be suggested, but sincejury trial may be had on any issue submitted, the provisions for waiver and im-
plied findings would seem to be a reasonable limitation. Cf. Proposed Rules, Art. 9,
§ 9(4). The laws of the Louisiana Territory and early laws of the state of Mis-
souri, provided trial by the court unless the party should "require" a jury. See
G=R's DIGEST (1818)256; Mo. Rev. Laws 1825, p. 630.
[Vol. 7
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facts, the defect may be supplied from the judgment. Liberal construction
of this remedial statute is essential for the workability of the special verdict.
The Texas Supreme Court unfortunately narrowed its concept of fact issues
which might be presumed in support of a judgment until it ultimately reached
the position that it would hot presume the finding of an ultimate fact issue
even though the particular issue is auxiliary to other issues actually sub-
mitted and found. 8' There seems to be no reason for such a limitation of the
scope of presumed findings, and both the language and purpose of the Fed-
eral Rule 49 justify the broadest construction."
Another difficulty of the special verdict is the question of what is an
issue of fact. Federal Rule 49(a) provides:
"The court may require a jury to return only a special verdict
in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact."
In submitting "issues of fact" to the jury, the court must tread a
precarious path between "evidentiary facts" on the one hand and "conclu-
sions of law" on the other. It was on this point that the Wisconsin and
North Carolina practice differed most widely from that of Texas.
Although there were decisions which interpreted the statute as requiring
a finding only of "ultimate facts" and not "evidentiary facts," this injunction
was more honored in the breach than in the observance, and the general
trend of the Texas decisions was toward a progressive multiplication of
issues. Thus, in Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co.,33 where the defendant alleged that
the plaintiff was guilty of fi 'e separate acts of contributory negligence, it
was held reversible error for the court to ask the jury whether the plaintiff
was in general "guilty of contributory negligence in his conduct" 34
31. See Lipscomb, supra, n. 8, p. 208, 209.
32. The first case involving presumed finding under Rule 49 was Hinshaw v.
New England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 104 F. (2d) 45 (C.C.A. 8th, 1939). In an
action by the insurance company for a declaratory judgment on certain annuity
policies, the defendant claimed they were fraudulently procured. The case was sub-
mitted for special verdict and the jury found for plaintiff on all questions except the
last, where they said that the agent had made false statement. The court gavejudgment for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed, alleging the eividence showed
fraud, since it must be presumed that the false statement was relied on. The court
held, however, that the finding of the trial court for the plaintiff was presumably
a finding that there was no reliance, hence no fraud, and since the defendant had
not submitted the question to the jury it had waived jury trial on the omitted issue.
33. 111 Tex. 461, 240 S. W. 517 (1922).
34. See: Gourley v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry., 25 Mo. App. 144 (1887). The
action was for negligence against the railroad for killing plaintiff's cows. Court
submitted question 4, "Were the cows of plaintiff injured through any careless or
negligent act of the defendant, its agents or employees," but refused to submit
1942]
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The Texas court, on occasion, likewise adopted a very strict position
in regard to conclusions of law or "mixed questions of law and fact." Thus,
it was held error to inquire whether defendant was indebted to plaintiff, 3
or whether the plaintiff had suffered a total loss,", although the court held
it proper to inquire whether defendant had adverse possessiona7 or whether
defendant had acted as agent of the plaintiff.3 8
The result of the Texas practice was to burden the jury with a multitude
of questions, and as Green says, "some ridiculous monstrosities were per-
petrated."3 9 It is recorded that one case was submitted on two hundred
issues.40
Wisconsin did not entirely escape this difficulty, although its supreme
court made a consistent effort to restrict the questions in special verdicts
to ultimate fact issues. One of its best statements is that in Baxter v.
Chicago & N. W. Ry.41 The action was for negligence in maintaining a
locomotive boiler in an unsafe condition so that it exploded and injured
the plaintiff. The court submitted the question of whether the defendant
could have discovered the defect "by reasonable and proper care, tests and
inspection" accompanying the question with an instruction on the meaning
question 5, "If you answer the above in the affirmative, then state in what did such
carelessness, or negligence, consist?" Held: Reversed for failure to submit ques-
tion 5. The plaintiff had alleged that the defendant was negligent in failing to
whistle at the crossing, although as a matter of law this was not negligence. The
court assumed that the jury's answer for the plaintiff on question 4 was based on
the jury's erroneous belief that defendant's failure to whistle was negligence, and
pointed out: "Had question 5 been submitted, this possible mischief could easily
have been prevented or corrected."
But cf. Holden v. Mo. R. R., 108 Mo. App. 665 (1904). Plaintiff alleged
defendant was guilty of three separate acts of negligence. Defendant asked court to
instruct jury that unless 9 of the 12 jurors could agree that defendant was guilty of
one or more of the alleged acts, they must find for defendant. The instruction was
refused. Held: Affirmed.
"The action was based on negligence, not on the way in which it was commit-
ted. The specifications were for defendant's benefit to notify it of the bounds in
which plaintiff would confine his evidence. When the evidence was in it was the
prOvince of the jury to determine whether or not the principal fact-negligence
within the bounds of the petition-had been established, not within one boundary
line, or a particular boundary line, but within all of them, generally, not specifically."
35. Watson v. Patrick, 174 S. W. 632 (Tex. App. 1915).
36. Commercial Union Assur. C9. v. Everidge, 72 S. W. (2d) 311 (Tex. App.
1934).
37. City of Abilene v. Reed, 294 S. W. 913 (Tex. App. 1927).
38. Gibbons v. McRoberts, 48 S. W. (2d) 733 (Tex. App. 1932).
39. Green, supra, n. 8, p. 717.
40. Dooley, Use of Special Issues Under New Texas Rules and Federal Rulie
(1941) 20 TEXAs L. REv. 32.
41. 104 Wis. 307, 80 N. W. 644 (1899).
[Vol. 7
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of "reasonable care" and "reasonable tests and inspection." Appealing from
a judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant asserted that this question called
for the jury's finding a conclusion of law rather than the facts.
The court affirmed the decision, saying:
"The degree of care with which defendant was chargeable was
strictly a legal question. Whether that degree of care was exer-
cised in the instance under consideration was strictly a question
of fact. The instruction properly laid down the law for the guidance
of the jury, and the question called for an answer as to whether the
defendant came up to the legal standard in the particular instance.
The jury was thus called upon to find the fact, not the evidence
of the fact, leaving it to the court to apply the proper legal prin-
ciples. ' '42
Speaking generally of the special verdict, the court said:
"It is a finding upon all of the material issues of fact raised by
the pleadings. A failure to distinguish between such facts and the
numerous evidentiary circumstances which may be the subjects of
controversy on the evidence and are relied upon to establish the
ultimate facts upon which the case turns, often leads to unjust
criticism of the special verdict. A conclusion is not one of law be-
cause it is reached by a process of reasoning from many primary cir-
cumstances. While such circumstances may be in dispute, the real
question is, do they lead with reasonable certainty to, and establish
the fact alleged by the pleading upon the one side and denied by the
pleading upon the other? If the subject of the allegation in the
complaint be one of law, or of mere evidence, it has no proper
place in the pleading and hence no necessary place in the special
verdict."43
To refer to the pleadings for a determination of what constitutes the
"issues of fact" in an action is no help if the pleadings are loosely drawn,
and evidence and conclusions of law are pleaded. The suggestion of the Wis-
consin court merely refers us to a different stage of the judicial proceeding
for determination of the issues. However, if the pleadings were made the
basis of the issues of the special verdict, Sunderland suggests, there would
be opportunity for careful preparation, sifting of cases and segregation of
issues.4 4 We would avoid the difficulties of special verdicts hastily framed
42. Id. at pp. 313, 647.
43. Id. at pp. 312, 646.
44. Sunderland, supra, n. 8, p. 263, et seq.
1942]
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on the evidence, and at the same time insure improvement in pleadings.
After all there should be some place in the trial of every case for analysis
and determination of the issues, although under our present system of
vague and verbose pleadings, followed by a general verdict, a case may
easily go to judgment without there being any clean-cut delineation of the
issues by the parties or the court, or understanding of them by the jury.
As Lipscomb says:
"The price for laxity must be paid at some point in the pro-
cedure; if the pleadings are loosely drawn, the trial judge and the
attorney must work the harder to present simple and precise issues
to the jury."48
North Carolina follows most nearly the practice proposed by Sunder-
land. The court and counsel determine in advance of trial the issues to be
submitted, and these issues govern evidence to be submitted and argument
of counsel. While it is called general verdict practice, the jury does not give
the blanket common-law general verdict for plaintiff or defendant, but
answers a few questions submitted by the court, each issue being submitted
by an appropriate question.46
With the questions submitted to the jury the North Carolina courts
use the general charge with all its fullness, complexity -and pitfalls.47 In
Wisconsin the general charge was formerly used, although the supreme
court has called it "bad practice," 48 and now instruction is limited to "gen-
eral rules of law' appropriate to the particular question of the special ver-
dict.14  In Texas, with its multiplicity of fact questions, there was little
place for general instructions. Adhering most closely to the common-law
practice, the jury was supposed to find pure facts and the law was to be
applied to its verdict by the court. It was considered error to let the jury
know the legal effect of its findings.5"
Thus, it will be readily apparent that however much we wish to reduce
the number of fact issues and to simplify the complexity of instructions,
there is an inverse ratio at work. In a negligence case, for instance, we may
require the jury to decide separately numerous disputed fact questions and
45. Lipscomb, supra. n. 8, p. 203.
46. Note (1940) 34 ILL. L. REV. 96.
47. Green, supra, n. 8, p. 719.
48. Byington v. City of Merrill, 88 N. W. 26 (Wis. 1901).
49. Banderob v. Wisconsin Ry., 113 N. W. 738 (Wis. 1907).
50. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. McLean, 280 S. W. 557 (Tex. App. 1926).
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allow the court to apply the law, or we may consider negligence itself to be
an "issue of fact" to be determined by the jury from all the evidentiary
facts under proper instructions on the law without requiring them to find
these facts. We cannot completely avoid instructing the jury on the law,
unless we wish to burden the jury with answering a great number of ques-
tions on facts. Properly used, however, the special verdict avoids both ex-
tremes with simple instructions on segregated issues of ultimate fact.
It is hoped that this review of the varying practices of Texas, Wiscon-
sin, and North Carolina will demonstrate that the proposed special verdict
statute is no magic talisman'to improve Missouri procedure. To insure its
workability will require the understanding, sympathy, and intelligent co-
operation of bench and bar.
Construed too strictly and artificially, as was done in Texas, we become
hopelessly bogged down in requiring our jury to find innumerable facts, with
the danger that it will be confused and misled. On the other hand, if the
issues of fact are construed too broadly, we are in effect left with the general
verdict in question and answer form. Between these two extremes there is
a broad area where the special verdict can function to permit the court
to require the parties to segregate issues, to try only matters really in dis-
pute, and to submit separate issues to the jury in simple language accom-
panied by minimal instructions, instead of by the confusing general charge.
General Verdict witA Special Interrogatories
The ise of special interrogatories with the general verdict has its origin
in the present-day purpose of the special verdict, namely, in an attempt to
limit the powers of the jury to return a verdict for one party or the other
in disregard of law, under the impenetrable cloak of the general verdict.
Although there are instances of its use in this country in the early common
law,"1 we find its first use in the New England states where the court, if it
were "surprised" by the jury's general verdict, might quiz the jury on the
verdict.52 This practice was later extended to permit special questions to
be submitted, for answer along with the general verdict.5 3 New York sanc-
tioned the practice prior to the Code of 1848, and the Code allowed con-
51. Morgan, A Brief History of Special Verdicts and Special Interrogatories(1923) 32 YALE L. J. 575.
52. Hix v. Drury, 5 Pick. 296 (Mass. 1827); See Wicker, Special Interroga-
tories to the Jury in Civil Cases (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 296.
53. Gordon v. Wilkins, 20 Me. 134 (1841).
1942]
12
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1942], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol7/iss2/5
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
tinuance of the practice." Over half the states have copied these pro-
visions, and a few went even further and made submission of special in-
terrogatories mandatory on request of the parties." Missouri adopted a
mandatory special interrogatory statute in 1885, but repealed it two years
later.rl
The chief advantage claimed for special interrogatories is that they
require the jury to give detailed consideration to the issues, which they
must do in order to answer the questions propounded. It is also asserted
that answers to special interrogatories may reveal that some alleged errors
were not prejudicial and offer a basis for curing others and hence avoid the
necessity of a new trial.17
The likelihood of new trials would seem to be increased under special
interrogatories, however. It is provided that if there is any inconsistency
between the general verdict and the answers to the special interrogatories,
the court may order a new trial; and if the answers are inconsistent with
each other and also with the general verdict, the court is obliged to order
a new trial, except that in both cases he may return the jury for further
consideration of its answers and verdict."'
Special interrogatories are subject to many of the same hazards that
exist in special verdict practice. Counsel may put their questions in a form
to mislead the jury, with the purpose of securing a new trial. Special in-
terrogatories may also be used to cross-examine the jury on the evidence. 5
54. New York Code 1848, §§ 216, 217.
55. Wicker, supra, n. 52.
56. See n. 7, supra.
57. Wicker, supra, n. 52.
58. Federal Rules, 49b.
59. See Flannery v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. Ry., 23 Mo. App. 120 (1886)
where Phillips, P. J. said:
"As the statute authorizing the submission of certain facts for the special
finding of the jury is new in this state, we deem it well to say at the outset,
that this statute is not to be made a move to entrap and mislead the jury,
nor an instrument in the hands of the practitioner for cross-examining thejury on minor and unimportant details. The questions submitted should be
strictly limited to the material issues made in the pleadings, and the facts
essential to support the verdict one way or the other. They should be as few
in number as will attain the ends of justice, so as to avoid confusing the jury
and leading them into unprofitable wrangling over non-essentials. And espe-
cially should the questions to be answered be intelligible to the apprehension
of the average juror and be in such form as to admit of categorical answer
under the evidence."
In Jackson v. German Ins. Co., 27 Mo. App. 62 (1887), the plaintiff alleged
waiver of prompt payment of premium. The court refused the defendant's request
(Vol. 7
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Cases may be found in the Kansas reports in which over a hundred special
interrogatories were submitted to the jury. 0 Obviously the only reason
for submitting such a number of interrogatories is the hope that the jury
may return an inexact answer unsupported by the evidence, or answers
inconsistent with the other answers or with each other. Just as in the case
of special verdict, a special interrogatory may be objected to because it
informs the jury of the legal effect of its answer.
In addition, the special interrogatory practice has its own unique prob-
lems. Unlike the special verdict, the special interrogatories are not neces-
sarily supposed to include every issue in the case. Hence, while the answer
to a special interrogatory may be inconsistent with the general verdict,
there may, nevertheless, be no basis for awarding judgment notwithstanding
the verdict,6' and a new trial inevitably results. While a few jurisdictions
have held that each interrogatory should be tested to determine if an answer
favorable to the party submitting it would be inconsistent with a general
verdict for his adversary, the general rule required only that the questions
submitted on an issue, taken together, should meet this test. Obviously, if
favorable answers to every interrogatory would not affect a general verdict
for the other party, they are immaterial.62
for the following question: "5. If verbally, what was said, and who said it, and
when and where?" Said the appellate court:
"The last interrogatory was properly refused. It is not contemplated by
the statute authorizing these special verdicts that the jury should be required
to report the evidence by which they reach their conclusion. It is a special
verdict, and not a report of the evidence by which they reach their verdict."
See also Turner v. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. Ry., 23 Mo. App. 12 (1886).
But cf. Benton v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry., 25 Mo. App. 155 (1887), where
the court held it was error to refuse defendants' question 8: "How far from the
place of collison was the train when the cow started toward the track?" Said the
court:
"Similar statutes have been in force in many of the western states for
some time. Their object, unquestionably, is to enable the court, and the par-
ties, respectively, to ascertain how the jury has found upon such independent
controlling facts as are requisite to justify legally their general finding for one
party or another."
60. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v. Cone, 37 Kan. 567, 15 Pac. 499 (1887) [136
questions]. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v. Brown, 33 Kan. 757, 7 Pac. 571 (1885)
[110 questions].
61. See Benton v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry., 25 Mo. App. 155 (1887): "As the
statute contemplates that the court may give judgment according to the special
findings, regardless of the jury's special verdict, the issues thus submitted as a
whole must be such that the court may legally construct a verdict upon the an-
swers of the jury to such questions, for or against one of the parties."
62. Tetherow v. The St. Joseph R. R., 98 Mo. 74, 11 S. W. 310 (1888):
"When the proposed question might be answered affirmatively or negatively with-
19421
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Since submission of special interrogatories under the proposed section is
discretionary with the court, refusal to submit a question will no longer be
a fertile ground for reversal. 63 Whenever special interrogatories are used,
however, the problem of what effect is to be given to them iemains. Courts
have labored mightily to distinguish situations in which an answer to a
special interrogatory is "inconsistent" or "unharmonious" with another
answer or with the general verdict, and when an answer to a special in-
terrogatory "controls" the general verdict and permits judgment to be en-
tered notwithstanding the verdict.64 It has been held that special findings
would not justify setting aside of a general verdict unless they were in irrecon-
cilable conflict with the general verdict, and before declaring a conflict the
trial court has the duty of making an effort to reconcile apparent incon-
sistency.65 The effort to effect reconciliations sometimes demands quite a
flight of the judicial imagination.O
The main advantage .claimed for the special interrogatory practice was
that the general verdict accompanying the answers to the special interroga-
tories was an assurance that there would be no failure to find on all material
issues. Since this defect in the special verdict is remedied under the pro-
posed rule by the provision for implied findings, it is difficult to see that this
is any longer any real advantage in the special interrogatory practice. There
remains the great disadvantage in special interrogatories that their principal
use is to nullify the general verdict by securing answers inconsistent with
it. The whole emphasis of special interrogatory practice is on obtaining a
negative result, i.e., a re-trial.
Just as in the case of special verdicts, the whole utility of special in-
terrogatories depends upon the attitude of the bench and bar. There are
out affecting the general verdict it should manifestly have been rejected."
But cf. Gourley v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry., 25 Mo. App. 114 (1887):
"It is manifestly within the scope and meaning of the statute providing
for the submission of special issues to the jury that, wherever a question ap-
pears upon which the court might properly instruct, there the court may, with
equal propriety, demand a special finding of the fact, and so apply the law to
the fact in ascertaining the measure of agreement between the special finding
and the general verdict."
63. See Moyer v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 39 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Pa. 1941).Questions refused because they were "confusing" and were "covered by the general
charge.!
64. Smith v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 19 N. M. 247, 142 Pac. 150 (1914);
Bass v. Dehner, 103 F. (2d) 28 (C.C.A. 10th, 1939).
65. HUGHEs, FEDERAL PRACTIcE, § 24324.
66. See Theurer v. Holland Furnace Co., 124 F (2d) 494 (C.C.A. 10th, 1941).
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situations in which it might prove convenient to submit -a case on a general
verdict, with special interrogatories to bring before the jury more clearly
a critical and confusing point. If the courts permit counsel to submit in-
terrogatories uncontrolled, however, the practice will hamper, rather than
improve, judicial procedure.
CONCLUSION
Enough has been said to illustrate the belief that the proposed Rule 15
is no panacea for the curing of all our procedural ills. Cooperation of the bar,
with liberal construction and close supervision by the courts, can make it
a useful tool in freeing the jury from its task of rendering a single verdict upon
a mass of evidence and in the face of an abstract and complicated general
charge, and in controlling possible abuse by the jury of its power. But so
long as we consider a lawsuit as merely a game in which the judge is referee
and the award goes to the cleverest player, there is danger that the special
verdict and special interrogatory will be just another weapon in the hands
of the more skillful practitioner, rather than an instrument for obtaining,
with more certainty, justice under law.
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